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When Singer writes that lIlI every natural
instinct the birds have is frustrated,"
I find it rather hard to confine the
impact of his words to the claim that
the birds are frustrated soleiy in ways
that cause suffering. To me there
seems to be an implication as well
that wrong has been done because nature
is not allowed to run in its own course.
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(Ref. E&A 1/2 review by Edward
Johnson of THE CASE OF THE ANIMALS
vs. MAN BEFORE THE KING OF THE JINN)
Edward Johnson
one argument
argument in
Johnson finds
finds one
in
Singer's
Singer's ANIMAL
ANIMAL LIBERATION
LIBERATION where
where II
found
Johnson subordinates
subordinates the
the
found two.
two. Johnson
claim
claim that
that animals'
animals' unlearned
unlearned desires
desires
are
are frustrate
frustrate in
in factory
factory farming,
farming, to
to
the
the theme
theme of
of suffering,
suffering, making
making hedonism
hedonism
the
the sole
sole basis
basis of
of Singer's
Singer's claims.
claims.
This
This seems
seems aa narrowing
narrowing of
of Singer's
Singer's
focus,
focus, as
as is
is suggested
suggested by
by the
the mention
mention
of
of unlearned
unlearned desires:
desires: if
if suffering
suffering

Similarly, when veal calves are called
lIunhealthy
unhappy"-the meaning
unhealthy and unhappY"-the
lI
is not simply that the calves are in pain
but they do not frolic and flourish
robustly as calves in "relatively
natural" settings might do. Again
nature is frustrate-over and above
the questions of pain and early death.
I find this perennial line of argument
obviously fallacious
interesting and not obViously
in any formal way but certainly subject
to a definite sort of abuse if one
attempts to formalize it by formulating
categorically the premises from which
such a conclusion might be drawn. Its
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an end in itself (despite the fact
that none is a moral subject or in a
human sense a conscious subject) through
existential claims to virtual subject
hood. By virtual subjecthood I refer
to the possibility of human subjects'
projecting themselves into any crea
ture's position." (p. 16) I regret
that Johnson placed an ellipsis where
I mention existential claims, suggesting
that my foundation for animal deserts
is subjective rather than ontological
and recognizable by (age old but here
newly analyzed) projective (and
rhetorical) devices. I have been
pursuing the idea of virtual subject
hood as a foundation for the recogni
tion of what I call a general theory
of deserts (one which applies to all
beings) in several of my recent phil
osophical studies. Whether other
philosophers shall find such avenues
worth exploring in old or new recensions
is, I think, a matter best left up to
them.
L. E. Goodman
University
of Hawaii
-.-------
(Ref. E&A 1/1 review by Robert
Greenwood of PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION)
Robert Greenwood is entirely correct
in pointing out that the brief dis
cussion of the problem of evil in my
PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION does not cover
the issue of animal pain. Further,
I agree with him that any thorough
treatment of the subject must take
account of the sufferings of other
forms of life than our own. I have,
however, written about this at some
length in Chapter 14 of my EVIL AND
THE GOD OF LOVE (2nd edition, Harper
and Row, 1978), and would refer the
interested reader to this.
John Hick
Claremont Graduate
SClle>oJ

(Ref. E&A 1/3&4 review by Peter Singer
of COMPASSION IS THE BUGLER- The
Struggle for Animal Rights)
As Peter Singer states in his review of
my book, COMPASSION IS THE BUGLER, I
am an Animal Welfare administrator
and not a philosophers and I endeavoured
to write a straightforward account of
two national campaigns in Britain
which have been responsible for changing
the whole face of the Animal Welfare
Movement in this country.
Whether that change will be for the
good remains to be seen. Singer
states that Animal Welfare Year and
the campaign to "Put Animals Into
Politics" have not yet yielded any
change in the laws relating to the
treatment of animals in Britain. In
this he is correct, but there can be
no doubt that changes in the law
will be made during the lifetime of
this Parliament, certainly in the
areas of animal experi~ntation,
the welfare of farm animals and the
protection of wildlife.
This is the dilemma now facing us
and the root cause for the present
disunity in the Animal Welfare
Kovement. For the past hundred
and fifty years the Movement has
been saying--"Abolish Vivisection
and more recently, stop factory farming
and ban blood sports". It is
comparatively easy to campaign and gain
public support when you are saying
"stop it it is wrong". We now have
to face the consequences of our own
success since, with legislation
pending in many areas which will not
abolish Vivisection or stop factory
farming or ban blood sports, the
Animal Welfare Societies have to decide,
do they intend to undertake the more
difficult task of trying to achieve
reform within the limits of how far
the Government is prepared to go or,
do they turn their back on such
efforts and continue to seek the
millennium.
History will record which of us are
following the right path for the
animal.s. we all _SI.erve • .
_
Clive Hollands
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Ref. E&A 11/1 review by Robert
Greenwood of "Animal Pain", Chapter
4 of PROVIDENCE AND EVIL)
The 'contradiction' that Greenwood
finds in my book PROVIDENCE AND EVIL
is a problem inseparable from the tra
ditional belief that the Son of God
is God and man, and that what is predi
cable of Christ as man differs from
what is predicable of him as God:
e.g., as man he suffered pain and died,
as God he neither suffered pain nor
died. Whether this is a real contra
diction obviously cannot be discussed
here; no special point arises, anyhow,
about the special pain of the compassion
Christ may have felt as a man for the
suffering of animals. It is further
more part of the same traditional theology,
which I defend, to hold that the Divine
Nature as such excludes any sort of
suffering, and thus that God the
Father, who was never incarnate,
never would suffer pains of sympathy
or any other pains. As for whether
the living world is designed to avoid
or even minimize the sufferings of the
lower animals, I must submit that all
the appearances are against this
supposition: maintenance of it looks
like wishful thinking.
I am surprised that a review in ETHICS
AND ANIMALS should actually not cite
what I say about how hmnan beings,
rather than their Maker, ought to
treat animals (pp. 103-106 of my
book) .
P. T. Geach
University of Leeds

(Ref. E&A 1/1, review by Bart
Gruzalski of "The Moral Basis of
Vegetarianism")
I have two comments on Bart Gruzalski's
review of my critique of vegetarianism.
(1) Gruzalski argues that I misapply
utilitarianism, in that I fail to take
into account animal emotion. Obviously,
animals are capable of experiencing
some emotions, such as fear. That
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they are unable to feel others, such as
sorrow at the passing of a social world,
is equally plain. The precise issue
is the weight to be given the impover
ished conceptual structure of animal
experience, and the rich conceptual
structure of human experience, in
attempting to determine whether vege
tarianism is mandated from a utilitarian
point of view
view••
•• The pleasures of taste
are not the only human enjoyment involved
in meat-eating. nor an unsatisfied
craving for such pleasures the only
pain involved in its renunciation.
Utilitarianism is here showing an
important ambiguity, arising from its
assimilation of all pains and pleasures
to the simple paradigms of headache
and orgasm. To maintain his credibility,
a utilitarian must be prepared to take
every variety of sorrow and delight
into account, while to work his
calculus he must treat all forms
of experience as homogeneous, and
reduce their attractive and unattrac
tive features to the simple categories
of intensity, purity, and duration.
The result of this argument turns out
to be the rejection of utilitarianism
as a moral system rather than support
for one or another of its applications,
but in playing utilitarian I am as
entitled to exploit the complexities
of suffering and enjoyment as lived
experiences as Gruzalski is to insist
on the homogenous portrayal of these
experiences necessary to the working
of a Benthamite calculus.
(2) Gruzalski complains that I overlook
the difference between using human
language and being a human speciesist.
My argument was that words such as pain,
fear, and grief have as their primary
referents human experiences, and that
their reference to nonhuman experiences
takes place byway of analogy. Some
nonhumans are enough like human beings
to permit the employment of such words
to their experiences, and chimpanzees
may be enough like human beings to
require the application to them of
some of the moral principles we apply
to human beings. But there is no
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